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Torts and Workmen's Compensation
TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
NEGLIGENCE

Injury Through the Use of Explosives - Res Ipsa Loquitur
Several cases decided by the Supreme Court during this last
term involved chiefly the resolution of a factual dispute or the
sufficiency of the evidence to show negligence.' Others raised
more basic problems and should be discussed briefly.
During a rainy season, defendant, acting under authority of
an exploration permit from plaintiff, set off a dynamite charge
in a hole drilled to a depth of about fifty feet at a spot on plaintiff's rice field. Less than an hour and a'half thereafter a portion of plaintiff's six foot high levee collapsed. The point of
collapse was about eight hundred and twenty feet from the explosion. Plaintiff was able to show by convincing circumstantial
evidence that the collapse and consequent inundation of his fields
was caused by the explosion; but he did not attempt to introduce proof showing any particulars in which he claimed the
defendant's conduct should be regarded as negligent. The court,
however, relying on res ipsa loquitur, gave judgment for the
plaintiff for the damage to the field. 2 The defendant had attempted to rebut the inference of negligence thus arising by
showing that the method used in no way varied from the usual
and customary procedure adopted by others for this kind of operation. The court, however, properly stressed the fact that the
occurrence itself remains in the case as testimony contradicting
the defendant's evidence as to the regularity of his practices.
As this writer has attempted to point out several times in the
past,3 any enterprise which makes use of explosives, gas, elec*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. Tauzier v. Bondio, 237 La. 516, 111 So.2d 756 (1959) (injury to pedestrian,
negligence and contributory negligence) ; Steele v. State Farm Mutual ins. Co.,

235 La. 564, 105 So.2d 222 (1958)

(intersectional collision, contributory negli-

gence of driver on favored street) ; Dunn v. Tedesco, 235 La. 679, 105 So.2d 264

(1958) (suit against landlord for death of children from allegedly defective gas
heater; defect not cause of death).
2. Langlinais v. Geophysical Service, Inc., 237 La. 585, 111 So.2d 781 (1959).
3. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference, 4 LOUISIANA LAW
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tricity, or other highly dangerous substances will be regarded
virtually as an insurer against any damage occasioned thereby.
In such instances the decision may be couched in the language of
negligence, but the most that can be said for the defendant's
predicament is that he has a theoretical "out" by demonstrating
convincingly that the occurrence was utterly unavoidable something which, in practice, he can seldom do. The distinction
between negligence and absolute liability is so shadowy in this
area of activity that familiar legal devices and gadgets such as
res ipsa loquitur, presumption, inferences of negligence and the
like, can be readily used by a court to hitch the standard of
care up to top notch and to still talk the language of negligence
even as it imposes a virtual insurer's liability.
Traffic and Transportation
A legal antiquarian rummaging through the records of cities
and towns for the first decades of this century would probably
encounter numerous regulations designed to protect the riders
and drivers of horses against the perils of the newfangled
"horseless carriage." A north Mississippi town, for example,
has never erased from its books an old ordinance requiring that
motor propelled vehicles be preceded by a man on horseback
armed with a red flag to warn of the approaching devil-machine.
Failure of the early motorist to take into strict account the
skittish nature of horses on the highway resulted in many sizeable damage awards. Times have changed, and perhaps the
sophisticated Dobbin of today is generally expected to take care
of himself. The current attitude of the courts is that the modern
motorist "is not required to reduce his speed at all when meeting
or passing animal-drawn vehicles or mounted horses unless he
observes that the animal or animals are frightened or indicate
'4
in some manner that they are disturbed by his presence."
Nevertheless, present day drivers cannot totally ignore the
wary nature of the horse, and sometimes the precautionary
measures expected of motorists are very exacting. A recent example will be found in Plauche v. Consolidated Companies.5
Deceased, a twelve-year old boy, was riding a horse across the
Simimsport-Atchafalaya bridge in disobedience to his father's
R1EV EW '70 (1941). See also discussion in previous issues of this symposium)
18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 63 (1957); 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 187 (1953).

,4-Plauche v. Consolidated Companies, Inc., 92 So,2d 298, 301 (La. App. 2d
,Cir.,97). See also Smith, v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 158 So. 844,. 847
(1La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
5. 235 La. 692, 105 So.2d 269 (1968).:,
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orders that he should lead the animal across the half-mile long
structure. This bridge is so designed that its superstructure
affords a semi-enclosed funnel surrounding the roadway which
is made of steel runways laid on a plank flooring. Because of
these features of construction a great deal of noise is generated by the wheels of passing vehicles. It was also found that
the confining enclosure of the superstructure is calculated to
frighten an animal. Under these circumstances the driver of
defendant's heavily loaded trailer truck was found to be negligent, first, by entering the bridge at all while it was occupied
by deceased and his horse who were only about three hundred
feet from the terminus, and, perhaps more important, by operating his air brakes as the truck passed the oncoming horse so
as to produce a hissing noise which frightened the animal,
causing it to throw and kill the child. In reply to defendant's
contention of contributory negligence the opinion emphasized
that a child's caution must be judged by his maturity and capacity to evaluate circumstances in each particular case, and he
must exercise only the care expected of his age, intelligence, and
experience. The court properly observed that the child's disobedience to his father's orders tended at most to show knowledge of danger and that the deceased had safely ridden his horse
across the bridge on previous occasions. The court did not mention the last chance doctrine, although it appears to this writer
that the contributory negligence issue could have been disposed
of favorably to plaintiff on that issue.
An interesting traffic accident involving three vehicles was
before the court in Billiot v. Noble Drilling Company.8 Mrs.
Miller's vehicle was proceeding down the highway followed at
a distance of fifty feet by the Billiot car, which was moving at
a speed of fifty miles per hour. Although Mrs. Miller gave the
proper hand signal for a turn as she reduced her speed, her car
Was struck in the rear by Billiot and pushed ahead about six
feet. Almost immediately after the cars came to rest the rear
of the Billiot car was struck by the vehicle of the defendant
drilling company which, as the court found, was being driven
carelessly as it approached from behind. The impact rammed
the Billiot car into the Miller car and both were pushed a distance of about eighty feet.' All injuries to both the front vehicles
Were'caused by this second impact. Miller sought damages
6. 236 La. 793, 109 So.2d 96 (1959).
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against both Billiot and the drilling company, while Billiot
claimed his own damage against the company. Both the court
of appeal and the Supreme Court concluded that, although Billiot
was negligent with respect to the first impact with the Miller
vehicle, yet this played no causal part with reference to the later
blow for which the drilling company's driver was responsible.
Strangely, however, the court of appeal denied Billiot's claim
against the company on the ground of contributory negligence.
This part of the holding was reversed by the Supreme Court.
Billiot was negligent only with respect to the first (and harmless) impact with the Miller car. He was not negligent toward
the following vehicle, whose driver was under a duty to so operate his car as not to follow another vehicle more closely than
is reasonable and prudent.
Wrongful Death - Funeral Expenses
The extent of responsibility of a wrongdoer for medical and
funeral expenses in death cases was clarified considerably by the
Supreme Court recently in Andrus v. White.7 In this case the
expenses had been paid by deceased's father, who had made no
claim against the estate for reimbursement. These items of
expense, however, were included in the damages sought by deceased's minor child - the only beneficiary entitled to maintain suit under Civil Code Article 2315. The court pointed out
that the ranking beneficiary may be entitled to recover for expenses of this kind where payment by the succession had resulted
in a reduction of the beneficiary's inheritance, or where the
beneficiary is legally obligated to pay such expenses or even
where he has actually paid them pursuant to a moral or natural
obligation. However, where, as here, the expenses were paid by
a third party who is not entitled to reimbursement as a beneficiary and who has made no claim against the estate, there is
no resulting damage to the beneficiary with respect to these
items and hence no right of recovery.
WRONGFUL SEIZURE OF PROPERTY

-

DAMAGES

A wrongful seizure of property pursuant to a foreclosure
proceeding constitutes an actionable tort under Civil Code Article 2315. In Hernandez v. Hanson8 the property seized and
detained for a period of twenty-one months was an automobile.
7. 236 La. 28, 106 So.2d 705 (1958).
8. 237 La. 389, 111 So.2d 320 (1959).
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Several interesting propositions were announced in the decision.
First, damages were allowed for depreciation in the value of
the car during the interval between its seizure and its return
to plaintiff plus one thousand dollars for "humiliation, mortification and mental anxiety, and for physical discomfort and inconvenience as a result of the deprivation of use and enjoyment
of his car during the period of its seizure and detention." 9 With
respect to these latter items the approach of the Louisiana court
differs from the usual common law position under which the
plaintiff would be entitled to indemnity for the deprivation of
use and enjoyment of the car, which would usually amount to
the rental value of the vehicle during the period affected. Emotional and non-pecuniary losses are usually denied in such cases,
although if the conduct of defendant were oppressive, an award
of punitive damages would be permitted at common law. In the
Hernandez case it was conceded that the defendant did not act
arbitrarily, oppressively, or in bad faith. In fact, the right to
possession of the car was in good faith dispute during the entire
period of its detention. The second point involved in the Hernandez case related to the defendant's plea of prescription. Normally the prescriptive period of one year runs from the. time
of wrongful seizure. Here, however, where the title to the property was in litigation in a separate dispute, the court properly
announced that the present claim could not have been effectively
prosecuted until title had been determined. Hence the running
of the prescriptive period was postponed until final judgment in
th title controversy.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
Work Which Is Not Part of Employer's
Trade, Business, or Occupation
Two years ago the Supreme Court decided the case, Meyers
v. Southwest Region Conference Association of Seventh Day Adventists,1 in which it concluded that a church organization is. a
business, trade, or occupation within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Statute. As this writer pointed out in a pre9. Id. at 401, 111 So.2d at 324.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 230 La. 310, 88 So.2d 381 (1956).

